Evolved Extinction

A case study in revisionist rationality

An Authoritative Statement

In the context of discussing long upheld traditionalist ideas that have been debunked by science, Dr. Natan Slifkin recently quoted the statement of the Sefer Hachinuch that no species can ever become extinct (and dispensed with it through such examples as the dodo bird). He then declares, “I subsequently discovered that this was the universal view of all religious authorities, Jewish and Christian, from the times of the Rishonim into the 19^th Century, as discussed in [my book] The Challenge of Creation”. Gosh. Our entire scholarly tradition seems to have blown this one.

I’ve read enough Slifkin to be familiar with the style, so I knew without checking that this new ‘discovery’ was almost guaranteed to turn out to be baloney¹. But for the benefit of our readership I took the time to look up his book and sources inside. It should come as no surprise at all that this matter-of-fact reference to a “universal view of all authorities” through 8 centuries of Rabbinic tradition rests on having located exactly five scholars in that entire period who make comments that he construes as relating to the topic².

Equally unsurprising is the sort of scholarship he employs in substantiating his discovery. There’s much to be learned from deciphering his analytics, it may be worth a few minutes of our time to see what we can turn up.

Malbim

After the Chinuch, the Jewish theological tradition goes mighty silent on this “universal view” for several centuries; the earliest subsequent source that Slifkin finds for this idea is the Malbim in his pirush to Tehillim 119:90. The Malbim there does not emphasize the immortality of every species, his point is to explain the contrast of לדור ודור אמונתך with כוננת ארץ ותעמוד – while the generations come and go, the species endures. However, he does make his point with the phrase a “הבטחה שלא יכלה המינים” associated with the directive of "פרו ורבו", which certainly makes it seem that he believes no species can ever become extinct³.

Except that he doesn’t. In a detailed dissertation on the fossils⁴, the Malbim quite candidly acknowledges the phenomena of now extinct species, and makes no attempt to justify it nor indicate that he finds the occurrence problematic in any way (it’s odd that Dr. Slifkin appears to be unaware of this, as he seems to have done quite a thorough combing of Malbim’s corpus in search for anything of relevance, and he furthermore attaches a great deal of significance to an almost identical discussion from the Netziv on this same passuk). As such, we’re forced to conclude that this one line in the Tehillim commentary was not meant as a blanket guaranteed immunity for every species for all time⁵, but rather – as the context indicates – a general statement about the self-sustaining regenerative system that Hashem built into the natural world.  

Netziv

With the Malbim, Dr. Slifkin at least had an actual quote to work with. Things go downhill from there.

For a second (and last) post Sefer HaChinuch source, our author points to the Netziv⁶ who speculates that dinosaurs were the grotesque byproduct of pre-mabul immoral crossbreeding, and thus they died out in the mabul. Slifkin informs his readers that the Netziv was troubled over how to square the possibility of extinction with his ideas on divine providence, and thus invented a specialty exception to account for it⁷.

Except that the Netziv gives no indication of this being his impetus, nor of the idea at all, nor is it contextually relevant to his discussion, which is to address the claims that these fossils are eons old and represent earlier evolutionary life forms⁸. At any rate, the Netziv’s actual intent is not in the least ambiguous: in response to the scientists who claim these monstrous creatures in lower strata as some ancient ancestor of modern animals, he posits that they were in reality separate species that were wiped out and deeply buried by the upheaval of the mabul – in fact, their very existence was one of the causes of the mabul in the first place⁹.

Most disturbing of all is the bald statement that “the problem for the Netziv was not the antiquity of the dinosaurs (he was doubtless unaware of the geological evidence that they lived long before humans), but rather the extinction of them”. Slifkin’s readers, who are only exposed to his one cherrypicked line from the Netziv, may take this at face value; in reality the Netziv’s full piece is directly addressed at the geological record which supposedly establishes the antiquity of the dinosaurs.

Rabbeinu Bachai

With the exit of the Malbim and the Netziv, Dr. Slifkin’s 800 years of universality loses 600 of them, as he quotes exactly zero sources between the Chinuch and the 19^th century. But what of sources predating the Chinuch? Was this at least “a universally held belief by all scholars” in the time of the Rishonim?

Well, if it was, they were pretty secretive about it. Let’s take a look at the presentation.

Determined to discover a universal view, Slifkin adduces evidence from Rabbeinu Bachai’s¹⁰ explanation of the mitzvah of shiluach hakein. He sees it as a limitation of our license to benefit from the animal world – while we are permitted to use individual animals, we are proscribed from wiping out an entire species. From here our author authoritatively, and incomprehensibly, ascribes to him the principle that G-d Himself will never find a species no longer necessary and therefore allow for its disappearance.  

If you’re wondering why that follows, here’s the explanation in Dr. Slifkin’s words: “But this would presumably also work the other way around. Accordingly, for G-d to allow a species to become extinct would mean that He does not care about the species – which is inconsistent with the classical understanding of G-d.” The head spins. Does the prohibition of ba’al tashchis presumably mean that G-d never allows a fruit bearing tree to get struck by lightning? And when He tells us not to murder, does that also mean He never causes anybody to pass away? After all, disregard for human life is inconsistent with the classical understanding of G-d.¹¹

Rambam

And then there’s the Rambam. Slifkin’s method of creating his case out of a selective citation from Moreh Nevuchim 3:17 is instructive. Readers of his book (where sources are cited only in the author’s own English rendering, not the Hebrew) learn that the Rambam quotes and endorses a statement of the “immortality of the species”. Here our academic author displays a bit of fancy footwork, let’s see if we can untangle it:

Moreh lays out various views about the mechanics of divine providence over the world, including one from Aristotle – that people get individual providence while animals are watched over only on a species-wide level – which the Rambam ultimately partially sanctions. In describing this species-wide providence, Rambam quotes Aristotle using the term “kiyum haminim”, which in context simply means the ‘preservation of the species’ – i.e. that Hashem tends to their general needs to keep them alive as needed. Slifkin, who wants to have Rambam negating the possibility of extinction, chooses to render “kiyum” as “immortality”.

The problem with this translation is that, aside from being completely unwarranted, it is also impossible in context. The term is used to contrast the individual animals to the group: “[by animals] the kiyum of the species is watched over, but not the kiyum of the individual”. Is he coming to debunk some popular conception that all individual animals are in fact immortal? Slifkin solves this problem by translating the exact same word in the exact same sentence differently in each instance: with regard to species he renders it “immortality”; five words later, with regard to individuals, he has it simply meaning “permanence”¹². Well, I guess that’ll work in a pinch.¹³ 

Immediately after this mistranslation of Aristotle, Slifkin places a paragraph from Rambam (from several pages later in the Moreh) “…The view that other living beings are only governed by Divine Providence in the way described by Aristotle is supported by the words of the Prophet…”.

Rambam’s entire discussion, and all he culls from Aristotle’s position, is whether the providence is general or specific. Slifkin’s placement of Rambam’s quote right after the paragraph with the term kiyum haminim (which Slifkin distorts to mean ‘immortality’) is designed to give the impression that that is what Rambam is ratifying; in reality all the Rambam says is that animals don’t have hashgacha pratius¹⁴.

If you’ve been keeping score at home, we have a statement of the Rambam misrepresented to be seen as an endorsement of a mistranslated statement of Aristotle, serving as the citation for the pronouncement that “Rambam, in his lengthy discussions on providence, also explains this means the perpetual survival of all species”.  

Ramban

The best case for another Rishon who shares this view is the Ramban. After Day 3 of creation, on the statement “Hashem saw and it was good” (1:12), Ramban comments, “קיום המינים לעד”. Slifkin renders this as a statement of every individual species being assured eternal survival.

On closer look, however, this is not at all the Ramban’s point. He explains his intent quite clearly in פסוק ד', and references it here: the point is to explain how “vaya’ar ki tov” serves as a fitting cap to each creative act – Hashem made things, found them fit, and thus preserved them as components of his completed world¹⁵. As the Ramban stresses: “The idea is that continued existence [does not automatically follow creation, but rather] is dependent on Hashem’s desire; and that if his desire would depart from them for an instant they would cease to exist”. In this sense, the statement קיום לעד simply means they were granted the permanence to exist indefinitely, not that there was some guarantee that Hashem may never choose otherwise at a later date¹⁶. It’s quite a stretch to assume the Ramban to be also clandestinely sneaking in a new theological tenet about the immortality of each individual species¹⁷.

However, while Ramban certainly never speaks of it as an ideological principle¹⁸, perhaps we can speculate that his choice of language reveals some unemphasized supposition on his part. We thus can assign to the possibility of Ramban ascribing to the eternal species doctrine a resounding “maybe”.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the available evidence indicates that prevailing Rabbinic views on the theological ramifications of extinction in the 11^th – 19^th centuries were very similar to what they are in the 21^st: namely, the topic was thought about by few, and cared about by less¹⁹.

What is clear from some authorities is that they ascribe significance to the institution of the species, as well they should, and so should we. Does this significance extend to a prediction that no individual species will ever be, for whatever G-d’s reasons, eventually phased out? For this idea we have the Chinuch, perhaps an allusion in Ramban, one Acharon who clearly says otherwise, two misrepresentations, and one mistranslation²⁰. Ergo, the discovery of a “universal view of all authorities from the times of the Rishonim through the 19^th Century”. 

Our concern here is not so much the question of extinction, which is of marginal significance at best²¹. But this exercise is instructive in that it helps us to read the author’s numerous other offerings in their appropriate light. Dr. Slifkin is a master of rhetoric who regularly makes authoritative sounding, if agenda laced, statements of revisionist scholarship to his audience of thousands. People reading his articles and books certainly form impressions on topics ranging from history to halacha to hashkafa from his apparent erudition. When we occasionally take the time to spot check his work, it reminds us that when we next hear him intone “the prevailing view amongst 13^th Century French Tosafists was yadi yadi yada”, we should be sure to have a loaded saltshaker handy.

1. I have no particular skin in this game, as no great theological crisis would result if a few more Rishonim did indeed articulate such a view. The idea does not seem to have a source in Chazal, nor is there any major ideological emphasis placed on it by anybody at all. To Slifkin this discussion is a big deal because he’d like to portray it as a case of a stridently upheld critical theological mesorah that was debunked by science; to the rest of us the whole issue is a marginal curiosity.

Our point here is not to squabble over the view itself, but to familiarize ourselves with the, eh, peculiarities of Dr. Slifkin’s analytical and presentational style. 

2. As for Christian sources, he does not provide any at all from mediaeval times. The idea seems to have been espoused by some later enlightenment thinkers, mostly from a philosophical naturalist perspective rather than a religious one. Some of them – like Thomas Jefferson, for example – clearly took the concept to quite an extreme; others simply spoke of interdependence or symmetry in creation, which Slifkin assumes must also mean they believed that every single species is deemed eternally immortal. Our focus in this essay is, of course, on the idea’s assumption in Jewish theological tradition. 

3. The Malbim’s only possible reference to the idea amounts to this one in passing line in Tehillim, which is itself strange. If he truly felt there was such a principle you’d expect him to actually articulate it as one. More specifically, if Malbim indeed sees “the blessing ‘be fruitful and multiply’ as an assurance that… no species will ever become extinct”, there’d be a very natural place for him to have said so: namely, in his ample Chumash commentary, by the passuk of פרו ורבו itself. There, the Malbim is entirely silent of any such idea.   

Dr. Slifkin provides several other quotations in an attempt to give the concept more prominence in Malbim’s thought (see his comments to Iyov 37:24, and Mishlei 30:18), but those turn out to be irrelevant observations about divine benevolence, or about the basic ability of animals to procreate. (In general, Slifkin seems to feel that every time he finds a reference to the “survival” or “perpetuation” of the species, it must be an intended allusion to a theological guarantee that no species will ever die out. I suppose all the National Geographic articles I’ve read that use the same term must also ascribe to this view.)

Slifkin further attempts to connect this idea with another one about no new species coming into existence, but in the Malbim himself the two points are unrelated. As expressed in Shmos 20:8, the latter idea is an observation about the exercise of creation being a one-time act and ending after the Six Days, and bears no relation to the theory of an eternal הבטחה on any species.

4. Bereishis 7:23.

5. Perhaps we can apply here the principle of dibra Malbim k’lashon b’nei adam.

6. Ha’amek Davar, Bereishis 7:23.

7. In his book, Slifkin acknowledges that the Netziv “does not explicitly say why he is addressing the issue of their existence” but “it seems that it was indeed to account for the question of how God could permit creatures to die out entirely”. On the blog he simply informs readers that Netziv was bothered by how they can die out and answers by saying that they were not naturally occurring creatures. No indication at all is given that this interpretation of the Netziv – who asks nothing of the sort, and whose statement is not presented as an answer to any theological problem at all – is an invention of the author’s.

8. That the Netziv’s intended target is the paleontologists is self-understood from a full reading of the piece, and from the fact that in the immediately preceding sentence he addresses the issue of fossils found outside their (modern) natural habitat. Part of his discussion is also focused on the view of the Tiferes Yisroel on this issue, which was an earlier attempt at answering these same questions. (Slifkin acknowledges that Tiferes Yisroel was not addressing the issue of extinction, yet chooses to cagily mention it here anyways as if it were relevant.) Both Rav Hirsch and the Malbim on the same passuk in Noach provide an approach essentially identical to the salient points of this Netziv, and clearly specify their intent to counter the paleontological theories. It’s strange that our academic researcher has failed to read Netziv’s words in their historical intellectual context.

9. It’s also worthwhile to note that even on Slifkin’s pseudoacademic historical contextual grounds there would be no basis to read this idea into the Netziv. Ha’amek Davar was published in 1880, several generations after the philosophical-naturalist “great chain theory” was effectively obsolete.

10. The Ramban explains this way as well. Ramban’s view on extinction will be discussed below.

11. Slifkin apparently got confused by the fact that the Chinuch, who himself does posit a theory of species immortality, explains shiluach hakein in its light. Which is perfectly natural for him to do, but the flip side simply does not follow. In fact, these Rishonim’s presentation indicates the exact opposite – they phrase it as an injunction against humans interfering with and mutilating Hashem’s created world; they say nothing at all that would indicate that Hashem Himself can’t run His world in whatever way He sees fit. If they would ascribe to the Chinuch’s view this would be the perfect place for them to mention it (as he does). As it is, their silence speaks volumes.

12. Thus, "מה שחייב קיום המינים ותמידותם ולא יתכן קיום אישיהם" is presented to Dr. Slifkin’s unwitting readers as “[Providence sends forth] sufficient influence to secure the immortality and constancy of the species, without securing at the same time permanence for the individual beings of the species”.

13. Slifkin’s other provided source from Moreh (2:28) is equally imaginative. There the Rambam discusses the permanence and perfection of G-d’s creation, quoting from Koheles “Nothing can be added to it and nothing can be taken away”. The Doctor informs us that this means specifically that no species can ever disappear.

Once again, this interpretation is entirely invented. Species are not the subject of the discussion, nor are they mentioned or alluded to in any way. Rambam’s language of “nothing can be added to or detracted from nature” is no different than Koheles’s own usage of the phrase: at face value physical phenomena come and go all the time, the point is simply a statement of the perfection and economy of nature in general (to the contrary, the implication is that if there’d be anything – species or otherwise – that no longer serves a purpose in G-d’s plan it would necessarily be phased out).

What absolute elements are immutable? Neither Koheles or Rambam specifies. It can be the laws of physics. Or the general divisions of the six days of creation (animal, vegetable, mineral). Or the chemical elements. Take your pick or make up your own. Slifkin arbitrarily pegs the Rambam’s intention at “species” and – viola – a theological tenet, ripe for scientific debunking.

14. In general, Slifkin chooses to see every reference to ‘hashgacha’ in the literature as an assurance of immortality. He thus even finds a Scriptural reference to the idea. The Book of Job, he tells us, describes “the great care with which He tends to the natural world. The implicit message is that G-d’s providence ensures the perpetual survival of all species.” Aside from the bewildering non-sequitur, we’re left puzzled over how the Rabbi Doctor makes peace with the fact that his disappearing dodos have now apparently refuted Tanach.   

15. The Ramban’s impetus is the word vaya’ar, which he explains as a term of assigning permanence. He provides several examples of this usage, most of which do not indicate permanence in the sense of ‘forever’.

16. At any rate, Ramban is discussing the sum total of the products of the third day. Whatever 'לעד' means, it’s most likely a reference to the general flora and fauna of creation, not a specific statement about any particular one.

17. Slifkin’s other reference from Ramban (Vayikra 19:19) is less impressive. In context there the Ramban simply describes the power of procreation as giving the species the ability to perpetuate itself. Nowhere does he imply a blanket guarantee of eternal inviolability to every single species, and the idea has no relevance to the context (the discussion there is about the preservation of the distinctions of the species, not the everlasting preservation of any specific one). 

18. Even if the Ramban entertained assumptions of species immortality, what’s remarkable is not so much that he thought this way, but rather how little importance he attached to it. The Ramban was a prolific theologian, and not at all shy about stridently expressing his views. What emerges from these quotes is that he – correctly – sees significance in the institution of the species, and possibly assumed, absent any reason to think otherwise, that they are generally here to stay. Not that there’d be some theological principle broken if any particular one turns out not to be.

19. On page 271, Slifkin informs his readers that the impossibility of extinction view is “still be found in certain ultraorthodox circles today”. His footnote provides the documentation: back in ’92 a high school Rebbe of his mentioned this Chinuch in shiur. We’ll have to assume that that particular Rebbe was quite an ultraorthodox circle.

20. Oh, and let’s not forget Thomas Jefferson.

21. The lack of emphasis given to the idea is important when we understand why Slifkin makes such declarations in the first place. His point was to demonstrate how fickle the mesora and traditional assumptions tend to be. A basic theological tenet espoused by all authorities can turn out to be a primitive unscientific error.

Alas, even if some Rishonim may have taken this on as an assumption, it certainly was never given prominence as an important theological idea; if it turns out to be inaccurate in the details it’s just another Tuesday in the Beis Medrash. This reality does not suit Dr. Slifkin’s agenda, hence his desperate attempts to create more references in the literature, and his strident declaration of having done so.

For the purposes of this review we’ve focused on the sources quoted by Dr. Slifkin in making his proclamation. If anyone is aware of any other sources on the topic we’ll be more than amicable to consider them; as we’ve said our main concern here is the scholarship, not whether or not some scholars some time somewhere doubted extinction.