Do We Misrepresent Our Opponents?

A poll

UPDATE 2: We won! Although there is a significant percentage of people who agree with Natan, a large majority agrees with us, that we faithfully represent his (deeply mistaken) views.

UPDATE: Formula to determine approximate total vote count:

First look at the percentage of “No” votes before you vote. We will call that “NO_0”. Then vote “No”.

We will call the percentage after you vote “NO_1”. We will call the total vote count after you vote “TOTAL_1”.

Then the formula for the approximate total vote count is

\(TOTAL_1={(1-NO_1)\over(NO_1-NO_0)}\)

As the vote count increases, this approximation will become increasingly inaccurate, since the percentage shows 0 decimal places.

When I say “opponents”, I am primarily referring to Natan Slifkin, who frequently whines about how Irrationalist Modoxism misrepresents his views. He complained that Quanon Natan was a misrepresentation, despite the fact that the entire article was verbatim quotes and hyperlinks to what he wrote. He complained that we quoted him as stating that “Torah doesn’t PRACTICALLY protect” although he has written that explicitly countless times. He complained that I paraphrased him as stating that “"Tosafos thought centipedes had asymmetric legs because Aristotle though men have more teeth", although this is a totally accurate depiction the point he was making (using the illustration of Aristotle as evidence that the ancients had a mindset of not noticing what was in front of their noses. See my discussion with “Daniel” here and here.)

And he had banned me because of these specious claims of misrepresentation.

Yesterday, Natan polluted our blog with another complaint, that I misrepresented his arguments in favor of Rashi possessing corporeal views (he also call our blog a moshav leitzim, as if a guy who writes drivel like this cares about such things.) I want to discuss that for a moment. My summary of his non-evidence was as follows:

1. We have testimony that there were some/many French rabbis close in time to the period when Rashi lived, who held corporealist views. Therefore, there is already a decent likelihood that he was one of them.

2. Rashi explains several Pesukim and Midrashim in ways that sound corporeal. Combined with #1, we have strong evidence that he was a corporealist.

3. Rashi never explicitly repudiates corporealism the way more philosophical authorities such as the Rambam do (although he implicitly repudiates it in many places, as Rabbi Zucker shows).

I will start with #1. Is this a misrepresentation?

Let us turn to the article:

However, the huge number of manuscripts available to us today reveals that in medieval Europe, and especially in Rashi’s homeland of France, it was by no means unthinkable to believe that God possesses form. The Tosafist R. Moshe Taku asserts that God sometimes takes on human form, and considers it heretical to deny—as Rambam does—His ability to do so.1 Rabbi Isaiah ben Elijah of Trani (known as Riaz, 1235-1300, grandson of Rid) speaks of scholars who believed in a corporeal God. He notes that they do not believe that He is made of flesh and blood, but rather that He is made of a more ethereal substance, in gigantic human form.2 While he disputes this view of God, he argues that those who possess this belief cannot be termed heretics, since even some of the holy Sages of the Talmud possessed this belief.3 Ra’avad famously disputes Rambam’s categorization of corporealists as heretics, stating that “greater and better people than Rambam” were corporealists.4 Rambam himself writes that he met someone rated as a great Torah scholar who had serious doubts concerning God’s incorporeality, and adds that he met others who insisted that God is corporeal and that it is heretical to believe otherwise.5 R. Shmuel ben Mordechai of Marseilles claims that the majority of Torah scholars in northern France believed in a corporeal God.6 Ramban (Nachmanides), writing to the Torah scholars of France, expresses his dismay at reports that these scholars condemned Rambam’s Sefer HaMadda for its denial that God possesses any form or image. He argues with them that Scriptural and Aggadic references to God’s form should not be taken literally.7 Numerous other sources attest to the existence of Torah scholars (not laymen) who believed in God’s corporeality.8 Thus, it is certainly conceivable that Rashi was part of this group. In fact, according to the testimony of Ramban and R. Shmuel ben Mordechai of Marseilles regarding the prevalence of this view in France, the onus of proof would perhaps be upon one claiming that Rashi was not a corporealist.

So, not a misrepresentation.

Next, #2

Another argument emerges from Rashi’s comments regarding the Tower of Babylon: “And God descended to see the city and tower which the sons of man built” (Genesis 11:5).Onkelos renders that God “revealed Himself” rather than “descended,” since, as explained by Rambam, only a corporeal being can move. But Rashi takes a different approach: “And God descended to see”—There was no need for this, but it was to teach judges that they should not convict the defendant until they see and understand [the situation]. (Rashi, citing Midrash Tanchuma) Rashi is citing the Midrash, which may well have understood Scripture non-literally, but Rashi does not show any concern (as does Onkelos) that one may interpret it literally. While some insist that Rashi must mean that the Torah wrote it this way in order to teach a lesson,41 not that God actually descended, the language of Rashi implies that God actually descended in order to teach it.42 Furthermore, Rashi makes no comment to Genesis 46:4 where God states that He will descend to Egypt. As we saw in the case of Shabbos rest and smoking anger, when Rashi feels that a phrase is dangerously anthropomorphic and needs to be explained nonliterally, he does so each time that it appears, and does not rely upon an earlier explanation. The same is true of the account of how God was pasach on the houses of the Israelites in Egypt. Onkelos, consistently with his avoidance of anthropomorphisms, translates this as meaning that God had mercy upon the houses of the Israelites. Rashi cites the view that pasach refers to having mercy, which cites a verse from Isaiah 31:5 as a source,43 but states that he prefers to translate it as referring to passing over, and traces the usage of it in Isaiah 31:5 to that meaning too. Rashi shows no concern for the motivation behind Onkelos’ translation, which was clearly to avoid the theological implications of ascribing movement to God. Thus, Rashi appears to be of the view that God can move. As Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam points out, anything that can move is necessarily corporeal, even though not everyone realizes this. Later, we shall see that Rabbeinu Tam objected to another instance where Rashi portrayed God as moving. Consistent with this is Rashi’s view of a Midrash found in some editions of the Passover haggadah: When the Holy One descended to Egypt, He descended with ninety billion angels of destruction… They said before Him: “Master of the Universe! Surely when a king of flesh and blood which You created in Your world wages war, his servants and ministers surround him so that he does not suffer any pain to his body? All the more so with the King, the King of Kings – it is proper that we, Your servants, and Israel, the children of Your covenant, exact vengeance from Egypt!” He responded to them: “My Mind will not be settled until I Myself go down and wage war with Egypt.” As Rabbi Yosef Albo notes, this Midrash is theologically problematic: God does not descend somewhere as an individual, surrounded by others; He is everywhere.44 But Rabbi Simchah of Vitri, a disciple of Rashi, gives a different reason as to why his rebbe Rashi did not recite this text: Because God is impervious to damage.45 This would fit with Rashi’s comment about God descending to Babylon; Rashi is not bothered by the idea of God descending and being spatially surrounded, only by the idea of His being vulnerable to harm.

Earlier we noted Rashi’s lack of comment concerning several Talmudic statements of aggadata that, at least at a superficial level, refer to God as being corporeal, such as the description of the size of God’s hand and cubit, and of God wearing Tefillin. We quoted scholars who stated that one cannot draw conclusions from this, as the French Tosafists (and Rashi) simply did not concern themselves with such things. But while that may be true with the Tosafists, it does not appear to be the case with Rashi. For there is one instance where Rashi does indeed concern himself with this. The Talmud cites a verse, “Who is it that comes to Edom with dyed garments from Batzrah?” (Isaiah 63:1), as referring to the angel Samael. Rashi comments: “Dyed garments” – from the blood of Samael. And even though the angels are not of flesh and blood, Scripture speaks of it as though with the slaying of man, to direct the ear with what it is able to hear. (Rashi to Makkos 12a) Here Rashi does see fit to explain that this anthropomorphism is not to be understood literally because beings such as angels do not bleed.46 Yet with regard to Talmudic anthropomorphisms concerning God’s form, Rashi makes no comment (FROM HAPPY. SEE THE ACTUAL RASHI TO YESHAYA 63:1 WHERE HE DOES COMMENT, AS MENTIONED IN THE PREVIOUS POST). This means that explaining anthropomorphisms non-literally falls within Rashi’s jurisdiction as a commentator; the fact that he does not do so with Talmudic passages speaking of God as possessing form and moving indicates that he interpreted such descriptions literally. There are two Talmudic passages in particular where there is an especially strong inference of corporealism, as we shall now see.

4a. The Hanging Man The Torah prohibits leaving an executed man hanging upon a tree overnight, stating somewhat cryptically that “the hanging is a curse of God” (Deuteronomy 21:23). The Talmud explains this phrase as follows: Rabbi Meir said: A parable; to what is this comparable? To two brothers, twins, who lived in the same city. One was appointed king, and the other went off to banditry. The king commanded that he be hanged, but everyone who saw him said, “The king is hanged!” The king therefore commanded that he be taken down. (Talmud, Sanhedrin 46b) This passage has obvious anthropomorphic implications, and several authorities take pains to establish that it should not be read in this way. Rabbi Meir Abulafia explains that the reference is to “the form of man’s intellect,” which is modeled after that of God. Accordingly, it is a disgrace to God for a man, who resembles Him in this way, to be left hanging.47 Ben Ish Chai and others argue that the twins in this account refer to man’s soul and body; it is man’s soul that is in the image of God, and his body is the physical counterpart.48 But Rashi explains simply that man is “likewise made in the form (dyukno) of his Creator.”49 The simple reading of Rashi is certainly that man physically resembles God.50 In fact, this has the advantage of accounting for why the resemblance even exists while the man is hanging dead. If the resemblance is in man’s spiritual aspects, it is more difficult to explain why he resembles God after these have disappeared with his death. While one could contrive a different explanation, Rashi makes no attempt whatsoever to dissuade his readers from such an interpretation, and the word dyukno in other contexts always refers to a physical appearance.

4b. God’s Two Eyes The Talmud invokes an exegesis to prove that a person who is blind in one eye is exempt from appearing at the Temple for the festival pilgrimages. It is based on the verse stating that “Three times a year, every male shall be seen to the face of God, the Master” (Exodus 23:17). The word yei’ra’eh, “shall be seen,” can be read as yireh, “shall see,” leading to the following exegesis: Yochanan ben Dehavai said in the name of Rabbi Yehudah: Someone who is blind in one eye is exempt from appearing, as it says, “shall see” “shall be seen”—in the way that he comes to see, so he comes to be seen; just as he sees with two eyes, so too he is to be seen with two eyes. (Talmud, Chagigah 2a; see also Erechin 2b and Sanhedrin 4b) The Talmud, however, does not state to whom the various mentions of “he” refer. Rashi explains that it to be refers to God, reading it as follows: Just as God comes to see man with His two eyes, so too He is to be seen by a man with two eyes. Does this mean that Rashi believed God to possess eyes? One could instantly point out that the Torah itself (Deut. 11:12) speaks of God’s “eyes” being upon the land. Just as one can understand the Torah as speaking allegorically, one can also understand Rashi that way. But it is not so straightforward. Scripture is speaking in the abstract, not in the concrete halachic. Translating the poetic, abstract idea of God’s eyes being upon the land into the concrete halachic statement that a person must likewise possess two eyes certainly sounds more like a literal interpretation of Scripture, especially in the absence of any disclaimer otherwise. It is presumably for this reason that we find other Rishonim preferred not to explain the passage in this way. Rabbi Meir Abulafiah51 admits that it can be read as referring to God, but he does not explain it as God possessing two eyes. Instead, he explains it to mean that God possesses perfect perception; when translated into a parallel requirement for the (human) pilgrim, this means that he must be able to see with both eyes. However Rabbi Abulafiah prefers to read the exegesis as referring to the eyes of a priest, not God: just as a priest sees the pilgrim with his two eyes (for a one-eyed priest may not serve in the Temple), so too the pilgrim is to be seen as possessing two eyes, and thus someone blind in one eye is exempt from appearing at the pilgrimage. Rambam also appears to avoid any anthropomorphic basis for this ruling, giving an entirely different Scriptural verse as the source, which enables him to avoid any anthropomorphic implications.52 Even more revealing than the different explanations of the Talmud adopted by some is the criticism that Rabbeinu Tam levels upon Rashi’s explanation. Rabbeinu Tam protests that when the Talmud states that “he comes to see,” one cannot say this means “God comes to see,” since God does not travel anywhere. He therefore reads the Talmud as follows: “Just as man comes to be seen by God with His two eyes, so too he comes to see God with two eyes.” Now, if Rabbeinu Tam understood the “eyes” of God figuratively rather than literally, surely Rashi could equally be speaking figuratively when he refers to God “coming.” Yet Rabbeinu Tam understands Rashi as speaking literally, and objects that Rashi is explaining God as needing to travel to places (which would be consistent with Rashi’s apparent view of God actually descending to Babylon). Rabbeinu Tam thus apparently interprets Rashi as referring to God’s literal eyes.

Again, not a misrepresentation.

Next, #3

Evidence #1: The Conspicuous Absence In the aforementioned cases, Rashi employs the method of nonliteral interpretation in order to avoid a specific class of anthropomorphism: the portrayal of God as being subject to exhaustion, physical toil, or being secondary in power to His creations. In each case, Rashi stresses that Scripture is speaking “as it were” in order to “direct the ear.” Yet with the multitude of verses describing God as possessing bodily form, he does not raise this principle. Scripture speaks of God’s arm,28 hand,29 finger,30 back,31 face,32 eyes, 33 and feet,34 and Rashi does not comment that Scripture is speaking “as it were” in order to “direct the ear.” Even the two verses we cited above speaking of God’s hand and face—where Rashi explained these terms figuratively—provide arguments in the opposite direction. There are several earlier instances where Scripture mentions God’s hand and face without Rashi explaining that Scripture is speaking figuratively. And even in these instances, Rashi does not state that Scripture is speaking “as it were” in order to “direct the ear”; instead, he is giving an explanation as to why, in these particular instances, the context indicates that the term is being used figuratively. Such cases have nothing to do with God being corporeal or incorporeal; just as Rashi’s comment of yad mamash related to translation, so too those are cases of translation. They are not proofs of God’s incorporeality. Not only does Rashi never state that anthropomorphic descriptions of God’s body are written “as it were” in order to “direct the ear,” Rashi sometimes, cites Midrashic expansions and even elaborates upon them: “You tilted Your right hand” (Exodus 15:12)—When the Holy One tilts His hand, the wicked are destroyed and fall. For everything is given into His hand, and falls when He tilts it. Likewise, it states, “And God shall tilt His hand and the helper will stumble and the helped will fall” (Isaiah 31:3). A parable: glass vessels are placed in a person’s hand; if he tilts his hand a little, they fall and smash. (Rashi ad loc., elaborating upon Mechilta 9) “For the Hand is on the throne of God” – The Holy One’s hand is raised to swear by His throne, that He will have eternal war and hatred against Amalek. (Rashi to Exodus 17:16, elaborating upon Midrash Tanchuma, Ki Tetze 11) And there are cases where Scripture does not mention anthropomorphisms, but Rashi independently introduces them in citing additional Midrashim: Abraham took a knife, seized his foreskin, and wanted to cut, but he was afraid as he was old. What did the Holy One do? He stretched out His hand and grasped it with him, as it says, “And He cut a covenant with him”; it does not say “for him” but “with him.” (Rashi to Genesis 17:24, citing Midrash Bereishis Rabbah 49:2) …From where did Moses merit the rays of glory? Our Rabbis said: From the cave, where the Holy One placed His hand upon his face, as it states, “And My Hand shall cover you.” (Rashi to Exodus 34:29, citing Midrash Tanchuma, Exodus 37) Had Rashi never in any place discussed the notion of reading verses non-literally in order to avoid anthropomorphisms, we could say that he does not deal with such issues. But from the fact that he takes pains to stress this lesson in certain instances, the glaring omission in others leads to the conclusion that he interpreted such anthropomorphisms literally (later we will explore potential counterarguments). This matches R. Isaiah de Trani’s report of how many Torah scholars conceived of God – possessing human form, but not subject to human weaknesses such as exhaustion. There is only one context where Rashi seems as though he might be saying that the idea of God possessing a body is metaphorical, but careful consideration reveals otherwise: “And with the breath of Your nostrils” (Exodus 15:8) – which emerges from the two holes of the nose. Scripture speaks of the Divine Presence, as it were, by a parallel to a king of flesh-andblood, so as to enable people’s ears to hear in accordance with their understanding; when a person becomes angry, wind emerges from his nostrils. Rashi again takes pains to repeat this when Scripture later mentions it: “The anger (literally “nose”) of God is smoking” (Deut. 29:19) – Through anger, the body heats up and steam emerges from the nose. Likewise, “smoke has arisen in his nose.” And even though this is not the case with God, Scripture enables the ear to hear that which it is accustomed and which it can hear in accordance with the way of the world. One might think that Rashi is telling us that the “nostrils” are allegorical; that God has no nose and thus no human form. However, careful reading indicates that the emphasis appears to be on the breath emerging from the nostrils, not the nostrils themselves: “when a person becomes angry, wind emerges from his nostrils.” Furthermore, if Rashi wished to tell us that God does not possess actual nostrils, why does he not make the same point when the Torah speaks of God’s hand, feet, face, back, etc? It therefore seems that Rashi does not say that the nose is figurative; rather, he says that the idea of breath emerging from the nostrils, as with a flesh-and-blood human, is figurative.35

I hope you can see clearly that Natan is being willfully blind or flat-out lying when he accuses me of misrepresenting him.

A sub-argument

One part of his argument that I didn’t emphasize in the previous post is the following: Natan asserts that since Rashi sometimes explains anthropomorphisms in various non-literal ways, it follows that every other time he quotes or explains anthropomorphisms without commenting on them, he understands them as literal. And so that Natan doesn’t accuse this of being a misrepresentation as well, I will quote him verbatim yet again:

In the aforementioned cases, Rashi employs the method of nonliteral interpretation in order to avoid a specific class of anthropomorphism: the portrayal of God as being subject to exhaustion, physical toil, or being secondary in power to His creations. In each case, Rashi stresses that Scripture is speaking “as it were” in order to “direct the ear.” Yet with the multitude of verses describing God as possessing bodily form, he does not raise this principle.

……

As we saw in the case of Shabbos rest and smoking anger, when Rashi feels that a phrase is dangerously anthropomorphic and needs to be explained nonliterally, he does so each time that it appears, and does not rely upon an earlier explanation. The same is true of the account of how God was pasach on the houses of the Israelites in Egypt. Onkelos, consistently with his avoidance of anthropomorphisms, translates this as meaning that God had mercy upon the houses of the Israelites. Rashi cites the view that pasach refers to having mercy, which cites a verse from Isaiah 31:5 as a source,43 but states that he prefers to translate it as referring to passing over, and traces the usage of it in Isaiah 31:5 to that meaning too. Rashi shows no concern for the motivation behind Onkelos’ translation, which was clearly to avoid the theological implications of ascribing movement to God. Thus, Rashi appears to be of the view that God can move.

…..

Earlier we noted Rashi’s lack of comment concerning several Talmudic statements of aggadata that, at least at a superficial level, refer to God as being corporeal, such as the description of the size of God’s hand and cubit, and of God wearing Tefillin. We quoted scholars who stated that one cannot draw conclusions from this, as the French Tosafists (and Rashi) simply did not concern themselves with such things. But while that may be true with the Tosafists, it does not appear to be the case with Rashi. For there is one instance where Rashi does indeed concern himself with this. The Talmud cites a verse, “Who is it that comes to Edom with dyed garments from Batzrah?” (Isaiah 63:1), as referring to the angel Samael. Rashi comments: “Dyed garments” – from the blood of Samael. And even though the angels are not of flesh and blood, Scripture speaks of it as though with the slaying of man, to direct the ear with what it is able to hear. (Rashi to Makkos 12a) Here Rashi does see fit to explain that this anthropomorphism is not to be understood literally because beings such as angels do not bleed.46 Yet with regard to Talmudic anthropomorphisms concerning God’s form, Rashi makes no comment (FROM HAPPY. SEE THE ACTUAL RASHI TO YESHAYA 63:1 WHERE HE DOES COMMENT, AS MENTIONED IN THE PREVIOUS POST). This means that explaining anthropomorphisms non-literally falls within Rashi’s jurisdiction as a commentator;

Now, as everybody (hopefully) can tell, this is an idiotic inference that even a first-grader wouldn’t make. According to this inference, we can “prove” that Rashi understood that one is supposed to literally circumcise one’s heart, since in many other places he explains verses non-literally but doesn’t do so in the case of heart circumcision (Devarim 10:16).

ערלת לבבכם: אֹטֶם לְבַבְכֶם וְכִסּוּיוֹ [YE SHALL CIRCUMCISE] THE FORESKIN OF YOUR HEART — the closure and cover that is on your hearts

Natan’s “inference” is worse than invalid, it is simply leitzonus.

Literally Purim Torah.

I am not sure if this was intentional, for the purpose of spreading kefira, or unintentional as we have come to expect of academic am ha’aratzus- but it seems too stupid even by those standards.

In any case, I hope that I have demonstrated to your satisfaction that there was no misrepresentation whatsoever, and Natan’s arguments are really as bad as they sound.