In the previous part of this essay, Part 1, we discussed why interpretation of the Torah is so important, and some idea of when reinterpretation may be warranted. In this part, we explain why certain reinterpretations of Creation and the Flood are totally unacceptable, we discuss why one cannot rely on Rishonim to say kefira, and we give some idea of what type of interpretations may be acceptable. At the end of this essay, I propose a novel interpretation that I have not yet seen in a Jewish source.
(In Part 3, we already explained why Natan Slifkin’s so-called “interpretation” of Creation in his book “Challenge of Creation” is worse than even the worst examples here.)
I would like to thank my editor, HaRav Mecharker B’chol Oz, for his invaluable assistance. It has been a pleasure working with him, and he has taught me a great deal.
Some examples of reinterpretation
The following are some traditional examples of reinterpretation, some more extreme and some less so.1
Rabbi Saadiah Gaon explains that the verse "you shall circumcise your heart" (Deut. 10:16) is an allegory for spiritual circumcision, not physical, which would kill somebody.2
Chazal explain that Reuven never slept with his father's wife, even though the Torah states explicitly that he did (Genesis 35:22), they interpret it to mean that he committed a related sin considered as wicked as sleeping with his father's wife.3
Chazal interpret "an eye for an eye" (Exodus 21:24) as referring to monetary compensation, not to knocking out the perpetrator's eye.4
One Sage claimed the entire Book of Job is an allegory, Job never existed.5
Abarbanel explains that the snake didn’t actually talk to Eve (Genesis 3:1), but ate the fruit in front of her, which “told” her, in her own internal dialogue, that it was permitted.
The Chassidic commentary מאור ושמש interprets the "signs" in the verse, למען שיתי אתתי אלה בקרבו, so that I shall place my signs in midst of them (Exodus 10:1) as the two signs that the Jewish people were given, Shabbos and Tefillin, rather than the Plagues that the verse is about.6
So we return to the question, what are the guidelines of a proper interpretation? As mentioned previously, the guideline is not that it must have precedent in older sources, as it has been standard practice for millennia for commentators to propose even quite original interpretations.
Interpretations that are simply…wrong
One guideline could be to reject an interpretation that is simply erroneous, fails to account for critical details, doesn't sufficiently explain that which it is attempting to do so, is contradicted from elsewhere, or is otherwise flawed. This is a very common cause of dispute within Chazal and between commentators, and literally comes up in tens of thousands of places.
However, if there are strong enough reasons to reinterpret something, then the commentators may take liberties that they wouldn’t otherwise. This seems to be the case with the second example we brought, where by normal standards, we could refute it simply by pointing out that the verse explicitly states that Reuven slept with his father’s wife, how could it be clearer? Nevertheless, Chazal felt they had strong enough reason to reinterpret it, and given that the entire Torah demands extensive interpretation, as stated in Part 1, this doesn’t seem unjustified.
Furthermore, דרוש ,גמטריא ,רמז, or סוד (homiletics, numerical interpretation, hint, or mystery), would not be bound by this standard. Therefore, the example we mentioned before from the Chassidic commentary מאור ושמש would not even necessarily need to be considered a reinterpretation, since it is firmly in the realm of דרוש.
Interpretations that fail by any standard
However, there are some interpretations that fail egregiously, no matter to what standard one is held, and no matter how necessary one believes it is. This would be where the interpretation simply doesn’t take the Torah seriously, such as clearly contradicting the rest of the Torah on a fundamental level, or if it is nonsensical beyond redemption.
For example, there are many commentators who explain the various features of the Tabernacle in a semi-allegorical sense, whether they correspond to the parts of Creation,7 or to philosophical concepts,8 to Torah values,9 or to the human body.10 But there is nobody sane who would propose that the entire construction of the Tabernacle was just an allegory that had no basis in reality. This interpretation would contradict the central role that the Tabernacle plays in so many other narratives and commandments.11 And if somebody claimed that all those other narratives and commandments are likewise connected to this allegorical concept, it would only increase the absurdity.
We can likewise exclude interpretations that contradict the overall theology of the Torah, whether the Written Torah or the Oral Tradition, even regarding something that is not a reinterpretation, but the plain reading. For example, it would be quite easy to read many verses of the Torah as contradicting Divine omniscience12, or the existence of an Afterlife13, even without reinterpretation. But the overall theology of the Torah demands we don't read them this way, and sometimes even reinterpret them to accommodate the theology of the Torah.14
Unacceptable interpretations of Creation and the Flood
The above guideline significantly restricts how one can reinterpret Creation and the Flood to be more in line with the current Truth of Science (TM). It is now clear that it is impossible to reinterpret Creation as an allegory for something else, such as natural evolution. The entire idea of a Creator is absolutely fundamental to Jewish theology, not confined to the Genesis narrative, but essential to the entire Torah and the whole idea of miracles.15 Therefore, any interpretation that claims the Creation narrative was never really a Creation, but an allegory for something else, must immediately fail on those grounds.
We are likewise restricted from interpreting the Flood narrative allegorically, or as theological fiction, because this would necessarily contradict the rest of the Torah that relies on that narrative. The Flood is not a self-contained story, but is part of a broader exposition about origins of the nations of the world, and especially the Jewish nation. With an allegorical Flood, there is no Egypt, no Ashur, no Canaan, there is also no Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and hence no Jewish nation that descended from them, no Exodus, and no Torah that was given to them.
On the other hand, the examples of reinterpretations that we mentioned previously don't have this problem, and in fact many of them are supported by the context of the Torah. 16
But the Rambam said it!
This is in response to all those Modern Orthodox academics17 who rely on the Rambam or other great sages to make claims that we would otherwise consider kefira (heresy). Let us assume, just for arguments sake, that the Rambam explicitly wrote something we consider kefira, such as that there will be no תחית המתים (Resurrection).18 So what? If the Rambam wrote that it is permitted to smoke on Shabbos, would that suddenly have validity? Of course not. If something was totally unacceptable before the Rambam said it, it doesn’t become acceptable just because the Rambam allegedly said it. This argument is especially bizarre coming from so-called “rationalists”.
What these Modern Orthodox “scholars” fail to understand is that Judaism didn’t start from the Rambam. There IS something called Mesoras HaTorah (Tradition of the Torah). The reason why the Rambam has any authority at all, the reason why he has more authority than, say, Augustine of Hippo, or Anan ben David, is precisely because of his fealty to the Mesoras HaTorah. It is because he was a brilliant recorder, organizer, and clarifier of the Mesoras HaTorah. When something is clear and unambiguous in this Mesorah (such as תחית המתים), the Rambam has zero ability to call that into question. If it was ever determined that the Rambam deviated from the Mesorah or the Torah itself with any sort of regularity, he would no longer be the Rambam, but rather ח”ו (God forbid) a כופר (apostate). And if we find something in the Rambam that seemingly goes against the Mesoras HaTorah, that does not lend it validity whatsoever, but rather is בטל כעפרה דארעה (null and void like the dust of the earth).
Of course, as Torah Jews, we are all students of the Rambam, the greatest posek (halachic authority) in the past thousand years. Every word of his has the greatest depth. If he says something that sounds incorrect or heretical, we would try our utmost to interpret it in a way that doesn’t carry those connotations. Sometimes, we would assume that the wording is a copyist error.19 Or, far more reluctantly, we may say that the wording was a writing error on his part.20 But in most cases, we can assume we simply don’t understand him, or we may attempt all sorts of elaborate explanations. This is preferable to suggesting that the Rambam wrote something false, or kefira.
Is suggesting alternative explanations to Chazal in opposition to the Mesorah?
As we have shown in Part 1, it has been the long-standing practice of many commentators to sometimes suggest alternate interpretations to Chazal. The question is, are they too going against the Mesoras HaTorah? Are they too engaging in kefira? And the answer is, absolutely not. They absolutely trusted Chazal's Mesorah from Sinai, and they absolutely trusted Chazal’s overall understanding of the Torah that drove them to interpret the text of the Torah the way they did. But just like we don't consider disputes among Chazal themselves regarding the fine details of the Torah to be in contradiction to the Mesorah, so too the commentators felt they were allowed to offer alternatives interpretations in the spirit of שבעים פנים לתורה, and with the knowledge that they did not know better than Chazal, but were merely humbly suggesting alternatives.21
Perhaps more importantly, these Sages almost always restricted their suggestions to the realm of Aggada, with the recognition that many Aggados were not meant to be understood as the only interpretation or the literal interpretation,22 even in chronological matters.23 But when it came to halacha, the commentators didn't deviate from Chazal's interpretations, recognizing that Chazal understood the halacha literally.24 Similarly, when it came to overall Torah understanding transmitted by the Mesorah, such as the faith in the Afterlife or תחית המתים, Divine providence, or the historicity of the Torah's narratives,25 they didn't deviate from the Mesorah (and if they ever did, ח"ו, their words are null and void. See previous section entitled "But the Rambam said it!").
So how can we reinterpret Creation and the Flood to better fit science?
Before we get to this, it is very important to reiterate what we stated in Part 3, that these questions won’t kill you. Judaism is full of unanswered questions, and has been since before the Torah was given. Nevertheless, it has been the practice of Torah scholars throughout the ages to attempt to to answer questions when able. So what types of reinterpretations would not run afoul of the above guideline, yet would enable the Torah to be more in line with the current Truth of Science (to the extent we feel convinced by it, which shouldn’t be much, see future essay on science)?
Well, we are not going to answer that. There are all sorts of approaches out there, from Rabbi Dovid Tzvi Hoffman, to Rabbi Hirsch, to Rabbi Kook, to Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan, to Challenge, to Schroeder, to Aviezer, to Spetner, to Goldfinger (notice how Slifkin is excluded. See Part 3). The list is endless. We are not going to start making halachic rulings about which, if any, of these approaches are acceptable. And it may very well differ based on the fine details. This is really a matter for the Gedolei Hador (The Great Rabbis of the generation) to decide. However, we can say that to the extent that these interpretations make sense in terms of the overall outlook of the Torah, don’t contradict the Torah elsewhere, don’t contradict the ideology of the Torah, and don’t contradict the Mesorah, they are more likely to be acceptable. And as mentioned previously, this is even the case where they don’t necessarily match Chazal 100%.
My novel reinterpretation attempt
I, Happy, came up with an rather novel reinterpretation that I have not yet seen in any Jewish source,26 as follows. The chronology of the Torah may theoretically not be exactly as it sounds. In both the chronologies of Adam and Noah, there may be gaps between father and son that the Torah doesn't mention, allowing for the principle of בני בנים כבנים (grandchildren can be called children) which can apply to the mention of תולדות (offspring).27
For example, the versesוְאַרְפַּכְשַׁ֣ד חַ֔י חָמֵ֥שׁ וּשְׁלֹשִׁ֖ים שָׁנָ֑ה וַיּ֖וֹלֶד אֶת־שָֽׁלַח: וַֽיְחִ֣י אַרְפַּכְשַׁ֗ד אַֽחֲרֵי֙ הוֹלִיד֣וֹ אֶת־שֶׁ֔לַח שָׁלֹ֣שׁ שָׁנִ֔ים וְאַרְבַּ֥ע מֵא֖וֹת שָׁנָ֑ה וַיּ֥וֹלֶד בָּנִ֖ים וּבָנֽוֹת׃ וְשֶׁ֥לַח חַ֖י שְׁלֹשִׁ֣ים שָׁנָ֑ה וַיּ֖וֹלֶד אֶת־עֵֽבֶר׃, When Arpachshad had lived 35 years, he begot Shelah. After begetting Shelah, Arpachshad lived 403 years and begot sons and daughters. When Shelah had lived 30 years, he begot Eber (Genesis 11:12-14) could theoretically mean that Arpachshad begot Shelach by becoming his grandfather or great-grandfather, rather than his father. The rationale would be that the Torah only mentions generations it felt were sufficiently important. This would potentially allow the addition of thousands or tens of thousands of years to the chronology in the Torah, solving some of the “problems” from scientific chronology (to the extent that we are bothered by them, see future essay on science).
Again, Chazal apparently understood otherwise, but to the extent that a lowly ignoramus like myself is allowed to propose novel interpretations, this would (in principle) be similar to the way the great commentators have sometimes proposed alternate interpretations to Chazal, even on chronological matters.28 However, it is very likely that I am not of the stature to suggest such novel interpretations, or even non-novel interpretations, in which case I humbly withdraw.
Addendum: Unacceptable secularist “Torah lessons”
One other application of the above guideline would be to eliminate the thousands of pages of material from the more progressive elements of so-called Judaism, that attempt to interpret the Torah according to the most up-to-date, in vogue modern values, such as democracy, feminism, equality, religious tolerance, freedom of speech, and criticism of authority figures. Of course, it is easy to find so-called “proofs” to these concepts from the Torah (such as teaching feminism from Sarah’s behavior with Avraham) or almost anywhere else; the Devil quotes Scripture for his purposes.
What is the difference between this and Midrashic/Chassidic homiletics? Chassidic homiletics are merely interpreting the Torah according to already well-established Torah ideology, such as the value of Mitzvos (Commandments), of Kedusha (Sanctity), of the idea of a Tzadik (righteous individual), and of lovingkindness towards one’s fellow Jew. Whereas these progressive intellectuals are interpreting it according to an ideology that is clearly anti-Torah. This is, of course, in addition to the fact that Chassidic exposition never contradicts the plain meaning of the Torah.
Readers will notice we are mixing between interpretations of Chazal and later commentaries. This is intentional, since the guidelines we are giving should be fundamental to the truth of the Torah itself, and not dependent upon who says the interpretation. Of course, the interpretations of Chazal command a completely different level of authority, as we mention later on.
Emunos V’Deyos, Maamar 7
Shabbos 55b. Somebody asked me how this interpretation is consistent with the principle אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו (Scripture does not lose its plain meaning, Shabbos 63a). Although I can think of several responses to this, the one I find the most simple is that the Talmud is only saying that the simple meaning still has relevance, not that the verse must be understood in its simple meaning alone. In the example on Shabbos 63a, the Talmud is bringing a verse (Psalms 45:4) חֲגוֹר־חַרְבְּךָ עַל־יָרֵךְ גִּבּוֹר הוֹדְךָ וַהֲדָרֶךָ, Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, oh mighty warrior, for it is your splendor and glory. The Talmud understands that this is an allegory for Torah study, and is not meant to be understood simply, yet asserts we can still use the simple meaning to prove that a weapon is the glory of a warrior. I believe a similar case is in Chullin 43a, where the Talmud uses the verse (Job 16:13) יָסֹבּוּ עָלַי רַבָּיו יְפַלַּח כִּלְיוֹתַי וְלֹא יַחְמוֹל יִשְׁפֹּךְ לָאָרֶץ מְרֵרָתִי , His bowmen surrounded me, He pierced my kidneys; He showed no mercy, He spilled my bile onto the ground, to show that piercing a kidney does not kill a person, since Job was still alive. Now, it seems clear that this verse is likewise allegorical, for there were no bowmen shooting arrows at Job. Yet the Talmud understood that it was an allegory for the physical ailments that befell Job, which would only make sense if it was the type of physical ailment that doesn’t kill somebody (although Job is full of allegories, he did not use allegories of his own death). Similarly with Reuven, he did not sleep with his father’s wife, but the Torah wants us to understand, through the plain meaning, that what he did was considered just as wicked as sleeping with his father’s wife.
Baba Kama 83b
Baba Basra 15a; Moreh Nevuchim 3:22
Although this is an example of דרוש, homiletics, and wouldn’t abide by normal standards of rigorous textual interpretations, we included it because it is an example of a far-flung interpretation that nevertheless doesn’t violate the guideline that should limit any interpretation, as we explain below.
Shemos Rabbah, 35; Josephus, Ant 3.181; Moreh Nevuchim 3:4
Ralbag, Exodus 25:10
Abarbanel, Exodus 25:10
Ibn Ezra Exodus 25:40
See similar reasoning Ramban Genesis 18:1
ובספר מורה הנבוכים (ב מב) נאמר כי הפרשה כלל ופרט אמר הכתוב תחלה כי נראה אליו השם במראות הנבואה…. והנה לדבריו לא לשה שרה עוגות ולא עשה אברהם בן בקר וגם לא צחקה שרה רק הכל מראה ואם כן בא החלום הזה ברוב ענין כחלומות השקר כי מה תועלת להראות לו כל זה וכן אמר (שם) בענין "ויאבק איש עמו" (בראשית ל״ב:כ״ה) שהכל מראה הנבואה ולא ידעתי למה היה צולע על ירכו בהקיץ… והנה לפי דעתו זאת יצטרך לומר כן בענין לוט כי לא באו המלאכים אל ביתו ולא אפה להם מצות ויאכלו אבל הכל היה מראה ואם יעלה את לוט למעלת מראה הנבואה איך יהיו אנשי סדום הרעים והחטאים נביאים כי מי הגיד להם שבאו אנשים אל ביתו ואם הכל מראות נבואתו של לוט יהיה "ויאיצו המלאכים וגו' קום קח את אשתך" "ויאמר המלט על נפשך" (להלן יט טו יז) ו"הנה נשאתי פניך" (שם כא) וכל הפרשה כלה מראה וישאר לוט בסדום אבל יחשוב שהיו המעשים נעשים מאליהם והמאמרים בכל דבר ודבר מראה ואלה דברים סותרים הכתוב אסור לשומעם אף כי להאמין בהם
See Genesis 18:21 and Rashi ad loc; Jonah 2:5 and Radak ad loc.
See Isaiah 38:18, Radak ad loc.; Job 14:12; Psalms 78:39, See Emunos V’Deyos, Maamar 7, Part 3
See Emunos V’Deyos, Maamar 7, Part 3
See Genesis 14:19; Exodus 20:11, 31:17; Isaiah 40, 45; Psalms 8, 89, 102, 104, Job 37-42, Proverbs 8:22-31, II Chronicles 2:11, Nechemia 9:6
See Ikkarim 1:12
See Ramban Genesis 1:1- ויש לשאול בה, כי צורך גדול הוא להתחיל התורה ב"בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים", כי הוא שורש האמונה; ושאינו מאמין בזה וחושב שהעולם קדמון, הוא כופר בעיקר ואין לו תורה כלל…
See Moreh Nevuchim 2:25- אבל אמונת הקדמות על הצד אשר יראה אותו אריסטו שהוא על צד החיוב ולא ישתנה טבע כלל ולא יצא דבר חוץ ממנהגו – הנה היא סותרת הדת מעיקרה ומכזבת לכל אות בהכרח ומבטלת כל מה שתיחל בו התורה או תפחיד ממנו…דע – כי עם האמנת חידוש העולם יהיו האותות כולם אפשריות ותהיה התורה אפשרית;
See Abarbanel Genesis 2:4- וכן בספור מעשה בראשית בששת הימים לא עשה הרב פירוש ולא נטיה מפשט הכתובים כפי מה שהעידה עליו התורה להיות אמונת חדוש העולם מקובלת אצל האומה.
There is no context in the rest of the Torah that would lend to "circumcision of the heart" being physical. Even though the Torah allows miracles, and could conceivably allow for such a miraculous procedure to occur, the context of that section isn't relating to miracles at all.
The reinterpretation of Reuven's action into a lesser sin that is considered like this greater sin does not contradict the rest of the Torah, or even the context that verse is in. In fact, the following verse that specifically includes Reuven in the family supports this reinterpretation. Now, if the verses following it stated that Reuven impregnated his father's wife, and talked about the children she bore from him, then this would indeed have been an invalid interpretation, similar to how “evening” and “morning” refute the idea that “days” means “levels”
"An eye for an eye" is not reinterpreted to mean something other than a penalty for the offender, but it is a lesser, yet proportionate penalty. And it is in fact supported by other verses that refer to monetary compensation for injuries (Exodus 21:19).
The allegorization of the book of Job doesn't contradict the rest of the Torah since it is a self-contained narrative that is not mentioned anywhere else in the Torah.
Similarly with the snake and Eve, this narrative is self-contained and nowhere else does the Torah reference talking snakes.
No need to list names, eh?
Sanhedrin 90a
See Maggid Mishnah, Issurei Biah 1:12 וא״כ מה שנמצא בכאן בספרי רבינו וכן בחייבי לאוין ובשניות הוא ט״ס שהרי חייבי לאוין שוגגין פטורין הן מכלום כנזכר למעלה וכ״ש בשניות שהם מדבריהם וא״א ליישב לשון זה בשום פנים
See Maggid Mishnah, Shevisas Yom Tov, 7:18 מה שנמצא בספרי רבינו שאם חל להיות ז' שלו ביו''ט שהוא מגלח במועד הוא טעות סופרים או אגב שטפא
See Moreh Nevuchim 3:4 ולא תרחיק זכרי פרוש יונתן בן עוזיאל – עליו השלום – ופרשי זולתו, שאתה תמצא הרבה מן החכמים וגם מן המפרשים חולקים על פרושו בקצת מלות ובענינים רבים מעניני הנביאים – ואיך לא יהיה כך באלה העמוקות? ועוד, שאני איני מכריע פרושי – אבל הבן אתה פרושו כולו מאשר העירותיך והבן פרושי – והאלוה יודע איזה משני הפרושים הוא הנאות למה שנרצה.
See for example Ibn Ezra Introduction to Eicha (אכן המדרשים על דרכים רבים נחלקים: מהם חידות וסודות ומשלים גבוהים עד שחקים), Ibn Ezra Genesis 25:34 (ואל ידחונו בקנה של דרש. כי יש לו סוד ואין לנו לחפש כי עמקו מחשבות הש), Rashba on Aggados, Berachos 54b, Mevo HaTalmud of Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chajes.
There are many other sources that refer to a principle, אין למידין מן האגדות (see for example, Introduction to Talmud by Rabbi Shmuel bar Chofni, Ramban, Nedarim 40a), which points to the same idea, that many aggados were not meant to be taken literally/historically. However, this approach must be qualified, since Chazal themselves derived many teachings from aggados. Perhaps we will devote another essay to clarifying this issue.
Regarding those who at times give alternative chronologies to Seder Olam, see Ramban Exodus 12:40, Radak Shoftim 18:1 and the Radak in many other places in the Prophets, Rashi and Ibn Ezra Daniel 11:2; Baal Hameor Rosh Hashanah 3b
For example, see Ibn Ezra Exodus 21:1, and the rest of Parashas Mishpatim.
Regarding Divine providence and the historicity of the Torah’s narrative, we don’t even need Chazal to know that this is the Mesoras HaTorah. This is clear from all over Tanach.
However, I see did a Christian who suggested it, Dr. William Henry Green (1825-1900) Professor of Old Testament at Princeton Theological Seminary, But as far as I can tell, there is nothing “Christian” or otherwise non-Jewish about this interpretation per se. I also want to be clear that I only saw Dr. Green’s theory after coming up with it on my own, and then Googling around.
See Rashi Genesis 20:12; Ramban Numbers 26:13; Radak Jeremiah 26:11, I Chronicles 1:17, 3:15, II Chronicles 15:16, and numerous other places in Chronicles.
See Rashbam Genesis 37:2
אלה תולדות יעקב - אלה המקראות ומאורעות שאירעו ליעקב. והנה זה הבל הוא, כי כל אלה תולדות האמורים בתורה ובכתובים יש מהם שמפרש בני האדם ויש מהם רבים שמפרשים בני בנים, כאשר פירשתי באלה תולדות נח. למעלה בפ' בראשית כתיב: ויהי נח בן חמש מאות שנה ויולד נח את שם את חם ואת יפת. ואחרי כן מפרש כי העולם חטאו: ונח מצא חן ואחרי כן מפרש: אלה תולדות נח בני בניו היאך כי שלשה בנים היה לו וצווה הקב"ה להכניסם בתיבה י"ב חדש ובצאתם ויולדו להם בנים אחר המבול, עד שעולים לשבעים בנים שהיו שבעים אומות, כדכתיב: מאלה נפרדו וגו'. וכן בעשו פרשה ראשונה מפרש בני עשו שנולדו לו במקום אביו ואחרי כן וילך אל ארץ וגו' וישב לו בהר שעיר וכל הפרשה. וכתיב: אלה תולדות עשו אבי אדום בהר שעיר. וכל פרשה שנייה זאת בבני עשו, וכשם שמצינו בעשו שפירש שבניו נולדו במגורי אביו קודם שהלך אל ארץ מפני יעקב, ובני בניו נולדו בהר שעיר, כן ביעקב למעלה כתיב: ויהיו בני יעקב שנים עשר וגו'. ומפרש לבסוף אלה בני יעקב אשר ילדו לו בפדן ארם ויבא אל יצחק אביו וגו' הרי פירש בניו של יעקב והיכן נולדו כאשר עשה בבני עשו. ועתה כותב אלה תולדות יעקב בני בניו שהיו שבעים והיאך נולדו. כיצד יוסף היה בן שבע עשרה שנה ונתקנאו בו אחיו ומתוך כך ירד יהודה מאת אחיו והיה לו בנים בכזיב ובעדולם שלה ופרץ וזרח ונתגלגל הדבר שיוסף הורד מצרימה ונולדו לו במצרים מנשה ואפרים ושלח יוסף בשביל אביו וביתו עד שהיו שבעים, וכל זה היה צריך משה רבנו לכתוב שעל זה הוכיחם בשבעים נפש ירדו אבותיך וגו
See Ramban ad loc.
ואפשר גם כן שירמוז "אלה" את כל הנזכרים בספר הזה שבעים נפש ירדו אבותיך מצרימה כי כאשר הזכיר ב"אלה תולדות עשו" בנים ובני בנים מלכים ואלופים כל אשר היו בהם עד זמן התורה כן ימנה בתולדות יעקב בניו ובני בניו וכל זרעו רק יזכיר בהם הפרטים בתולדותם
See Ramban Numbers 32:41 וּמַה שֶׁאָמַר הַכָּתוּב בְּסֵפֶר יְהוֹשֻׁעַ (יז א): ״וַיְהִי הַגּוֹרָל לְמַטֵּה מְנַשֶּׁה כִּי הוּא בְּכוֹר יוֹסֵף, לְמָכִיר בְּכוֹר מְנַשֶּׁה אֲבִי הַגִּלְעָד כִּי הוּא הָיָה אִישׁ מִלְחָמָה וַיְהִי לוֹ הַגִּלְעָד וְהַבָּשָׁן״ - גַּם כֵּן עַל בָּנָיו שֶׁהָיוּ אַנְשֵׁי מִלְחָמָה, כִּי הֵם הָלְכוּ גִּלְעָדָה וַיִּלְכְּדוּהָ, וּלְכָךְ נָתַן לָהֶם מֹשֶׁה חֵלֶק גָּדוֹל מֵהֶם.
See especially I Chronicles 7:14 for an example of a great-grandson called a son בְּנֵי מְנַשֶּׁה אַשְׂרִיאֵל אֲשֶׁר יָלָדָה פִּילַגְשׁוֹ הָאֲרַמִּיָּה יָלְדָה אֶת־מָכִיר אֲבִי גִלְעָד׃, see Radak there בני מנשה אשריאל אשר ילדה. מן הנראה בתורה (במ' כו,כט-לא) כי אשריאל מבני גלעד בן מכיר בן מנשה, והוא היה הבן השלישי לו; ובהרבה מקומות מצאנו בזה הספר שזוכר בני הבנים בסדר הבנים, והֵנה גם כן זכר אשריאל בבני מנשה ואע"פ שהיה בן בן בנו…
Also see Radak Shoftim 4:2 אשר מלך בחצור. קודם שהכם יהושע והחריבם ושרף את חצור ומלכה הכה בחרב ויבין הוא שהיה מלך חצור אז ומה שנשארו מאותה משפחה הלכו לחרשת הגוים ונתישבו שם והמלך נקרא ג"כ יבין כמו המלך הראשון ופירוש חרושת הגוים מתרגמינן יער חרשא כי היו ביער ההוא מגדלים חזקים וישבו בהם הכנענים הנשארים ותירגם יונתן בחרושת הגוים בתקוף כרכי עממיא
Also see Radak I Samuel 2:33 לכלות את עיניך. ר"ל עיני בני בניך אשר יהיו בזמן ההוא וכן ולאדיב את נפשך נפש בני בניך שיהיו בזמן ההוא
See previous section entitled “Is suggesting alternative explanations to Chazal in opposition to the Mesorah? ”
Thank you Reb Happy G. L. for this illuminating post. It's also nice to see how Michelangelo's creations have been evolving healthily over the centuries. Based on the observed rate of development, my computer models tell me if we check back in 500 years the figure on the right will look like Elvis and the one on the left will be wearing a burqa.
I hope it's ok to throw in my two cents on a couple of your points:
1. It would seem there's an important distinction to be made between "interpretation" and "reinterpretation"; i.e. instances of a mefarish adding a novel facet to understanding a passage versus a binary alternative pshat which actually contradicts chazal or the mesora.
The former, if well reasoned and operates within a suitable framework, can certainly be legitimate under the concept of shivim panim. The latter would not appear to ever be legitimate at all.
2. With regard to relying on the Rambam to say something off the beaten path: even if the Rambam says something that most other meforshim consider untenable (which he certainly does on occasion), and even if we can't write him off because he's the Rambam, that still does very little for us on a practical level. Because as consumers of mesoras haTorah our job is to understand the corpus of mesoras haTorah, not just the Rambam. So if you have a hard time with the traditional interpretation you've got a problem regardless, Rambam notwithstanding. Just like you can't write off the Rambam, you also can't write off rov minyan u'binyan of mesoras haTorah.
Perhaps the fact that the Rambam says something makes me unable to call you a heretic for also saying it. But the goal of limud haTorah doesn't end at being "not a heretic"; you've also got to understand Torah on its own terms, which includes the traditional mesora. So what did you gain?
Both of these points individually would seem to render your suggested reinterpretation of the doros chronology at least not very helpful, even if not unacceptable (which, as you indicated, it might be as well).
And while I have no problem per se with your explanation of why it's unacceptable to allegorize the mabul, it does seem to skip over the main reason why it's unacceptable: because such an approach contradicts - not just adds a twist to - 3 thousand years of mesoras haTorah.
3. To clarify some axioms: mesoras haTorah is not simply a utilitarian tool to learning that says hey since this is how the earlier generations learned it's more likely to be right (although it certainly is that too). It's the fundamental structure and purpose of limud haTorah, to connect to the chain from Sinai and learn, understand, preserve, and pass on the Torah that Hashem gave us there. If someone's approach to "learning Torah" involves ignoring and directly contradicting mesoras haTorah he's kinda missing the boat.
4. One relatively more minor point: in at least two of your opening examples you fail to mention the main reason why the interpretation is ok: the episode of Reuvein and the explanation of an eye for an eye are ok because they are the correct and basic interpretation of those versus as taught by Torah shel ba'al peh, which is every bit as authoritative as Torah shebiksav. So those are not examples of "reinterpretations" at all.
5. The Rav Saadia is also neither a reinterpretation nor an allegory. He's simply doing what meforshei chumash do for a living: translating the words. He translates the term as a metaphor, which is a perfectly legitimate literary device that the Torah uses often. That has nothing to do with deciding that an actual event recorded in the Torah never really happened but was just meant as a parable of some sort.
Sorry for being so long winded. I look forward to your thoughts on all this. Thanks again for a great piece.
Great post! I want to thank you, Rabbi Happygolucky Personage. Your prodigious erudition and eloquent writing style greatly enhance Irrationalist Modoxism. We are honored to have you as a valued contributor to our platform. It wouldn't be the same without you.
I want to chime in on your discussion on the Rambam. In his book The Limits of Orthodox Theology, Marc Shapiro spends a considerable amount of time attempting to discredit the 13 Ikkarim by cherry-picking isolated cases of individuals who do not appear to accept them as necessary tenets of faith. Much of his work has already been debunked as misrepresentations and disingenuous arguments by Sochaczevski and Grossman.
Moreover, Shapiro conveniently overlooks the fact that many of these principles are explicitly articulated by Chazal. For instance, the Gemara in Perek Chelek extensively discusses Techiyas Hameisim, which you use as an example. Chazal unequivocally state that anyone who denies it is a kofer who does not have a place in Klal Yisroel and will not inherit olam haba. The Gemara also cites numerous proofs of this concept from Tanach, including Yechezkel's vision of the dry bones. So speculating that perhaps the Rambam did not hold of it (even though he never denies Techiyas Hameisim and writes in a few places that he did hold of it) as a "lesson to the moderns" that they need not be concerned about it is pretty crazy stuff. If the Rambam wouldn't have held of it, he wouldn't be the Rambam. As you so succinctly put it, the Rambam's entire authority was as a codifier of Jewish law and tradition. Not as its creator.
It is always amusing to observe how self-important academics produce extensive essays that mockingly dismiss tradition as a result of close-minded Torah scholars, yet they are exposed time and time again as having pulled their pants down publicly by misrepresenting the evidence.
See here for a classic example:
https://irrationalistmodoxism.substack.com/p/on-knowing-how-to-learn-part-ii