Goodbye Zeidie Biden
Last things first. I don’t usually talk politics, or even think about it, but I have a confession to make. I am dispirited, downtrodden, and down in the dumps about our President’s performance in the debate last week. Unlike probably 99% of you, I am I dyed-in-the-wool deep blue (“techeiles”) New England Democrat, without all that LGBTQABCDEFG toeivah and woke nonsense. Gun control. Health care. Infrastructure. Eliminating poverty. Support for Israel. I will not apologize for my positions. And President Joe Biden to me, like to millions of other Americans, was like a dear grandfather. Zeidie Biden. He was approachable, good humored, and common sense to boot. Good old-fashioned conservative values. That’s really why we voted for Zeidie over all these other young progressive whippersnappers. He was consistently a good friend of Israel, even under intense pressure from the left-wing of his own party. I don’t think Trump would have done any better, and would probably have done worse. But alas, Zeidie is declining, and will probably end up in a nursing home in the near future. I feel like somebody who had two grandfathers, the frum and the non-frum. The Zeidie and the Grandpa. Zeidie is gone, and we will have to make do with crazy old Grandpa Don.
Why AI Will Never Be Able to Pasken
With that out of the way, this is what I really wanted to comment on. There have been voices coming up from dark corners of the internet about how with the amazing advances in AI, we won’t need rabbis anymore. After all, if ChatGPT can respond to any shailah and sound the same as a rabbi, is there really any difference? This is a grave error. This is the same error and Slifkin made when he claimed that there is no such thing as “knowing how to learn”, it’s just a matter of analyzing texts. Because that’s exactly what ChatGPT knows how to do. It analyzes trillions of texts and pumps out a synthesis of said texts. But it doesn’t know how to learn. Knowing how to learn requires a Mesorah. It requires reasoning. It requires Yiras Shamayim. It requires Shimush Talmidei Chachamim. It requires the “fifth cheilek of the Shulchan Aruch”. Without these, you will get very bad results.
Here is a sample of the learning capabilities of the latest ChatGPT 4, which everybody is gushing about:
Me: What is the machlokes about גניבה באונס with a שומר שכר
ChatGPT:
The machlokes (dispute) about גניבה באונס (theft under duress) with a שומר שכר (paid guardian) is a complex topic in Jewish law (Halacha). A שומר שכר is someone who is paid to guard an item and thus has higher responsibilities compared to a שומר חינם (unpaid guardian).
The core of the debate revolves around the liability of a שומר שכר in cases where the item under their protection is stolen under duress.
Key Points of the Machlokes:
Rambam's Position:
The Rambam (Maimonides) holds that a שומר שכר is liable for theft (גניבה) regardless of whether it was under duress or not. This is because a paid guardian is expected to take all necessary measures to protect the item, and failure to do so, even under duress, indicates negligence.
Raavad's Position:
The Raavad disagrees with the Rambam and argues that a שומר שכר should not be held liable for theft under duress (גניבה באונס). He reasons that duress situations are beyond the control of the guardian and thus do not constitute negligence.
Shulchan Aruch:
The Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law) generally follows the Rambam's opinion, holding the שומר שכר liable for theft under duress, reflecting a stricter approach towards the responsibilities of a paid guardian.
Talmudic Background:
The dispute is based on interpretations of Talmudic discussions, particularly in Bava Metzia, which deals with the responsibilities and liabilities of different types of guardians. The Talmud examines various scenarios and the extent to which guardians are responsible for unforeseen or forceful events.
Practical Implications:
In practical terms, the difference in opinion affects how Jewish courts might rule in cases where a paid guardian claims that the theft occurred under duress. Those following the Rambam would hold the guardian liable, while those aligning with the Raavad would exempt the guardian from liability in such cases.
This machlokes highlights the broader tension in Halacha between holding individuals accountable for their responsibilities and recognizing situations beyond their control.
Me: What does the Ketzos say about this in regards to a שומר אבידה
ChatGPT:
The Ketzos HaChoshen, in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, delves into the responsibilities of different types of guardians, including a שומר אבידה (guardian of a lost item). Specifically, he addresses whether a שומר אבידה is considered a שומר חינם (unpaid guardian) or a שומר שכר (paid guardian), and how this classification affects their liability.
Ketzos HaChoshen on שומר אבידה:
Classification of שומר אבידה:
The Ketzos HaChoshen (291:1) discusses the nature of a שומר אבידה and considers whether such a guardian should be treated as a שומר חינם or a שומר שכר. Generally, a שומר אבידה is treated as a שומר חינם because they are not paid for their guardianship. However, there are opinions and circumstances under which they might assume some responsibilities similar to a שומר שכר.
Liability for גניבה באונס:
The Ketzos HaChoshen examines the case of theft under duress (גניבה באונס) in the context of a שומר אבידה. He explores whether this guardian should be liable for such theft. His analysis suggests that even though a שומר אבידה is typically considered an unpaid guardian, their responsibilities might extend further, especially when the guardian benefits in any indirect way from guarding the item.
Comparative Analysis:
The Ketzos often compares the liability of a שומר אבידה to that of a שומר שכר and a שומר חינם, noting that a שומר אבידה might be expected to take more care than a שומר חינם but less than a שומר שכר. This nuanced position affects the interpretation of their liability in cases of theft under duress.
Specifics of the Ketzos’ Argument:
The Ketzos HaChoshen carefully analyzes various sources and opinions to argue that a שומר אבידה might have a higher level of responsibility than a typical unpaid guardian due to the mitzvah (commandment) involved in returning a lost item. This mitzvah could impose additional obligations on the guardian, potentially increasing their liability in certain cases, including גניבה באונס.
In summary, the Ketzos HaChoshen provides a detailed and nuanced perspective on the liability of a שומר אבידה, particularly in relation to theft under duress. He navigates the fine line between the different types of guardians and the specific responsibilities each type carries, highlighting the unique position of a שומר אבידה within Halachic jurisprudence.
Me: What is the Ketzos's dispute with the Ibn Ezra on this
ChatGPT
The Ketzos HaChoshen and the Ibn Ezra have different interpretations regarding the status and liability of a שומר אבידה (guardian of a lost item). Here is a summary of their dispute:
Ketzos HaChoshen's Position:
Nature of a שומר אבידה:
The Ketzos HaChoshen (291:1) argues that a שומר אבידה, while typically considered a שומר חינם (unpaid guardian), may assume additional responsibilities due to the mitzvah of returning a lost item. He suggests that this mitzvah could elevate the level of care expected from the guardian, possibly to the extent of a שומר שכר (paid guardian) under certain conditions.
Liability for Theft Under Duress:
The Ketzos HaChoshen posits that because of the elevated responsibility due to the mitzvah, a שומר אבידה might be held liable for theft under duress (גניבה באונס), similar to a שומר שכר. He believes that the obligation to perform the mitzvah can impose additional obligations on the guardian.
Ibn Ezra's Position:
Status of a שומר אבידה:
The Ibn Ezra, on the other hand, maintains that a שומר אבידה is unequivocally a שומר חינם. He argues that the guardian of a lost item should be treated like any unpaid guardian, as they are not receiving compensation for their efforts and therefore should not be held to the same level of liability as a paid guardian.
Liability for Theft Under Duress:
According to the Ibn Ezra, a שומר אבידה should not be held liable for theft under duress, as this would align with the typical responsibilities of a שומר חינם, who is generally not liable for theft or loss that occurs beyond their control.
Dispute Summary:
Responsibility Level:
Ketzos HaChoshen: Argues that the mitzvah of returning a lost item can elevate the responsibilities of a שומר אבידה, potentially making them liable for theft under duress.
Ibn Ezra: Maintains that a שומר אבידה remains a שומר חינם and should not have elevated responsibilities or liability beyond what is typical for an unpaid guardian.
Liability for גניבה באונס:
Ketzos HaChoshen: Suggests possible liability due to the increased responsibility from the mitzvah.
Ibn Ezra: Asserts no liability for theft under duress, as the guardian's status remains that of an unpaid guardian.
This dispute highlights the different perspectives on how the obligation of performing a mitzvah can influence the responsibilities and liabilities of a guardian in Jewish law. The Ketzos HaChoshen's view introduces a more stringent approach, while the Ibn Ezra's view maintains the standard categorization and liability of unpaid guardians.
Me: And what is their dispute in regards to מוקצה for a שומר שכר specifically
ChatGPT:
The Ketzos HaChoshen and the Ibn Ezra have a notable dispute regarding the concept of מוקצה (muktzeh) for a שומר שכר (paid guardian). This dispute centers on whether a שומר שכר has the ability or obligation to handle muktzeh items during Shabbat, considering their duty to protect the items they are guarding.
Ketzos HaChoshen's Position:
Responsibility of the Shomer:
The Ketzos HaChoshen asserts that a שומר שכר is still obligated to safeguard the items in their custody, even on Shabbat. This responsibility might override the prohibition of handling muktzeh in certain cases. He suggests that the shomer's duty to protect the item could justify handling muktzeh items to prevent loss or damage.
Muktzeh Status:
According to the Ketzos, the muktzeh status of an item does not absolve the שומר שכר of their responsibility. Instead, the need to fulfill their duty as a guardian can allow for leniencies in the laws of muktzeh.
Ibn Ezra's Position:
Strict Adherence to Muktzeh Laws:
The Ibn Ezra, maintaining a more traditional view, would argue that the laws of muktzeh remain in full force regardless of the guardian's responsibilities. For him, the sanctity of Shabbat and the prohibitions against handling muktzeh items take precedence over the shomer’s duty to protect the item.
Separation of Duties and Shabbat Observance:
The Ibn Ezra might emphasize the importance of upholding Shabbat laws strictly, suggesting that a shomer should not violate muktzeh prohibitions. He could propose alternative solutions, such as arranging for the protection of the items in a way that does not involve handling muktzeh.
Specific Dispute Points:
Handling Muktzeh to Prevent Loss:
Ketzos HaChoshen: Argues that a שומר שכר can handle muktzeh items if it is necessary to prevent loss or damage, as their duty as a paid guardian may permit this.
Ibn Ezra: Maintains that handling muktzeh items is prohibited regardless of the guardian’s responsibilities, upholding the sanctity of Shabbat.
Halachic Prioritization:
Ketzos HaChoshen: Prioritizes the guardian's responsibility, allowing for exceptions to muktzeh prohibitions in light of the shomer’s duty.
Ibn Ezra: Prioritizes strict adherence to Shabbat laws, suggesting that guardians must find alternative methods that do not involve handling muktzeh.
Practical Implications:
For the Shomer:
According to the Ketzos HaChoshen, a שומר שכר might be more lenient in handling muktzeh items if it is essential for fulfilling their duty.
Following the Ibn Ezra, a שומר שכר would need to avoid handling muktzeh items and seek other solutions to protect the items without violating Shabbat laws.
Conclusion:
The Ketzos HaChoshen and the Ibn Ezra provide differing perspectives on the balance between a שומר שכר's responsibilities and the laws of muktzeh on Shabbat. The Ketzos HaChoshen offers a more lenient view that allows for exceptions to muktzeh prohibitions in light of the guardian's duties, while the Ibn Ezra upholds a strict interpretation, emphasizing the sanctity and unalterable nature of Shabbat laws.
Me: What is Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh deModena's third opinion on the above
ChatGPT:
Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh de Modena, a notable Italian rabbi and scholar from the 16th-17th centuries, has a third opinion on the issue of מוקצה (muktzeh) for a שומר שכר (paid guardian). His view offers a different perspective that balances the responsibilities of the guardian with the observance of Shabbat laws.
Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh de Modena's Position:
Contextual Handling of Muktzeh:
Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh de Modena posits that a שומר שכר should consider the context and specific circumstances when deciding whether to handle muktzeh items on Shabbat. He suggests a more nuanced approach that takes into account both the guardian’s responsibilities and the spirit of Shabbat.
Risk Assessment:
According to de Modena, the guardian should assess the risk to the item and the degree of necessity for handling it. If the risk of significant loss or damage is high and no other solution is viable, handling muktzeh may be permissible. However, this should be done with caution and only as a last resort.
Balancing Duties:
De Modena emphasizes the importance of balancing the guardian’s duty to protect the item with the sanctity of Shabbat. He advises that guardians should plan ahead to minimize the need to handle muktzeh items, such as by securing the items in a safe manner before Shabbat begins.
Specific Points of Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh de Modena's Opinion:
Contextual Considerations:
De Modena advocates for a case-by-case analysis, considering factors like the value of the item, the potential for loss or damage, and the availability of alternative protective measures that do not involve handling muktzeh.
Permissibility in Cases of Necessity:
He allows for the handling of muktzeh items in situations of significant necessity, where the loss or damage would be considerable and no other options are available. This reflects a pragmatic approach to the guardian's duties.
Preventive Measures:
De Modena encourages guardians to take preventive measures before Shabbat to avoid situations where handling muktzeh becomes necessary. This proactive approach helps to uphold the spirit of Shabbat while still fulfilling the guardian’s responsibilities.
Practical Implications:
For the Shomer:
Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh de Modena’s approach offers a middle ground between the more lenient view of the Ketzos HaChoshen and the strict view of the Ibn Ezra. A שומר שכר should carefully assess each situation, balancing the need to protect the item with the importance of observing Shabbat laws.
Conclusion:
Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh de Modena’s opinion provides a nuanced and pragmatic approach to handling muktzeh items for a שומר שכר on Shabbat. He emphasizes context and necessity, allowing for exceptions in cases of significant risk while encouraging preventive measures to minimize such situations. This perspective seeks to harmonize the responsibilities of the guardian with the observance of Shabbat, offering a balanced solution to the issue.
See? Do you need any more evidence than this? Doesn’t it sound exactly like one of our friend’s essays on kollel or army service or how Rashi was a corporealist? Like an academic trying to write Torah as if it was a college paper, with all the academic jargon? Even using fancy words like “jurisprudence”. You can expect more of this from the future of AI rabbis. The entire debate about female rabbis is obsolete now, because all the (LW- yes we are very careful about specifying that) modox will be scurrying to the genderless AI to get responses like the one above.
Of course AI can't pasken. It might be able to find or summarize sources, but peak requires shikul hadass.
The question of whether AI will ever be able to pasken is just another way of phrasing the question whether AI will have human style consciousness.
I think a fundamental, perhaps the most fundamental, of Yiddishkeit is that consciousness in a fundamental property of its own, not simply emergent from high intelligence.